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THE DSU REVIEW (1998-2004):
NEGOTIATIONS, PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
Thomas A. Zimmermann*
Introduction
On 1 January 1995, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement
Understanding; DSU) entered into force. Since 1998, negotiations to
review and reform the DSU have taken place (DSU review), however
without yielding any result so far.
The DSU review exercise has only attracted limited academic interest
to date. This lack of interest in Members’ proposals and negotiations is
rather astonishing, particularly if judged in the light of the general
explosion of literature on the World Trade Organization (WTO),
including on its dispute settlement system. Whereas even single
adjudicating decisions such as the rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle or the
Bananas cases have each become the subject of countless contributions,
the efforts of the entire WTO community to make the DSU evolve further
have long been neglected. Only recently, a certain academic interest in
these negotiations and in the submitted proposals can be noticed.1
The over-emphasis of the DSU literature on rulings and
recommendations, and the parallel lack of interest in the political
discussions on the DSU, is questionable from both an analytical and a
practical perspective. From the analytical point of view, it creates a
general perception in which the role of the adjudicating bodies tends to
be chronically overstated and where the intergovernmental, member-
driven character of the WTO is largely overlooked. Practically, such a
distorted assessment may lead to policy recommendations or actions
which are out of tune with political realities and which may undermine
the sustainability of the system.
* The views expressed in this article are exclusively those of the author and shall not
be attributed to any institution with which the author is affiliated. This contribution is
based in part on Thomas A. Zimmermann, Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding (London: Cameron May, 2006).
1 An interesting collection of recent essays is F. Ortino and E.-U. Petersmann, The
WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2003 (The Hague: Kluwer, 2003).
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The DSU review negotiations, albeit unsuccessful so far, have brought
forth a variety of proposals in the last seven years. These submissions
are supposed to contribute to improvements and clarifications of the
mechanism. Not only is the DSU review of interest in its own right, but
it also offers a reflection of the experience that WTO Members have
gathered in 10 years of dispute settlement practice. In doing so, the
discussions are revealing with regard to the general degree of satisfaction
of Members with the system. They can also serve as an indicator for
problems or tensions in the mechanism and for changes in the position
of certain Members in and towards the system. Finally, the DSU review
discussions assist us in establishing some hypotheses on the future
evolution of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
This chapter seeks to contribute to the DSU literature by retracing the
negotiating process in its context and by analyzing the main reasons
why the negotiations have failed so far. Part 1 analyzes the negotiations
that have taken place between 1997 and 2004. In Part 2, the reasons for
the failure to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion so far
will be discussed, based on a brief presentation of major proposals.
Part 3 presents some elements of a “DSU Review in practice”, ie practical
steps that Members and adjudicating bodies have undertaken to adapt
DSU practice to changing circumstances and requirements without
modifying the text of the DSU. Part 5 concludes with the following. The
last chapter offers some conclusions from the preceding analysis.
1. The DSU Review Negotiations (1997-2004)
1.1 The Initial Stage of DSU Review Negotiations (1997-
1999)2
Initially, the DSU review had been mandated by the Ministerial Decision
on the “Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes”. The Decision, which
had been adopted on 14 April 1994, called upon Ministers to “complete
a full review of dispute settlement rules and procedures” within four
years after the entry into force of the WTO agreement, and “to take a
decision on the occasion of its first meeting after the completion of the
review, whether to continue, modify or terminate such dispute settlement
rules and procedures”.
2 For a detailed account of this stage of DSU review negotiations and further references,
see Th. A. Zimmermann, Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding 93-105 (London:Cameron May, 2006).
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After some preparatory work, substantive negotiations under this
mandate started in mid-1998. They were held in a largely informal mode
and were supposed to conclude by the Third Ministerial Conference, ie
the Seattle meeting in December 1999. Several Members participated in
the negotiations (inter alia the European Communities, Canada, India,
Guatemala, the United States, Venezuela, Hungary, Korea, Argentina
and Japan). Despite the generally broad negotiating approach, the
negotiations were soon dominated by two divides: one ran between
certain industrialized countries (mainly between the US and the EC)
whereas the other pitted industrialized against developing countries.
The rift between industrialized countries was mostly due to the efforts
of the United States to strengthen the enforcement quality of the system.
Being a “net complainant” in these initial years of DSU practice, and
having prevailed in several “high profile” cases (such as EC–Hormones,
EC–Bananas, Canada–Magazines, or India–Patents), the United States became
increasingly worried that the implementation of the dispute settlement
reports would remain behind their expectations. They therefore pressed
forward with retaliatory measures and threats thereof, whereas the
European Union and Canada tried to delay the implementation of
rulings. This situation translated into different proposals in the DSU
review negotiations on the so-called sequencing issue which arose for
the first time in EC–Bananas over ambiguities (or even contradictions,
as some may argue) in Articles 21.5 and 22 DSU. The key question was
whether a “compliance panel” must first review the implementation
measures undertaken by a defendant before a complainant may seek
authorization to retaliate on grounds of the defendant’s alleged non-
compliance. Whereas the US initially opposed any idea of sequencing
and favored immediate retaliation, the EC and many other Members
argued in favor of the completion of such a compliance panel procedure
as a prerequisite to seeking an authorization to retaliate. The EC
underlined its position, inter alia, by bringing a DSU case against US
legislation requiring early retaliation3 and against its application4 in
EC–Bananas, as well as by seeking an authoritative interpretation of the
DSU in this respect.5 All these attempts ultimately failed.
3 United States–Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (brought by the EC) (WT/
DS152).
4 United States–Import measures on certain products from the European Communities (brought
by the EC) (WT/DS165).
5 Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article IX.2 of the Marrakech
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (Communication by the EC to
the General Council) (WT/GC/W/143).
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Another attempt by the US to increase the enforcement power of WTO
dispute settlement was to introduce so-called “carousel retaliation”.
This term refers to periodic modifications of the list of products that are
subject to the suspension of concessions, and it surfaced for the first
time when the “Carousel Retaliation Act of 1999” was introduced in
Congress. Its purpose was to increase pressure on the EC Commission
and European governments in EC–Bananas and EC–Hormones by
requiring the US Administration periodically to rotate the list of
products subject to retaliation in order to maximize the effect of the
sanctions. The measure was signed into law in May 2000 but has so far
never been applied. Whereas the EC (supported by many other nations)
sought a prohibition of carousel retaliation in the DSU review of 1998/
1999, the US had sought a footnote explicitly allowing such retaliation.
In a parallel development, the EC had requested consultations under
the DSU on the carousel provision in summer 2000, however, without
proceeding to the panel stage.6
Finally, the US did not only pursue a “tough stance” on sequencing and
on the carousel issue, but it also sought shorter timelines for certain
steps in WTO dispute settlement.
The controversy between developed and developing countries was of a
different nature. It mainly focused on whether the external transparency
of dispute settlement should increase, and on whether so-called “amicus
curiae briefs” should be accepted by the WTO adjudicating bodies. The
United States pressed hardest for both forms of public involvement.
Regarding transparency, the US sought to make submissions of parties
to panels and the Appellate Body public, and to allow public observance
of panel and Appellate Body meetings. Developing countries in
particular, but also some industrialized countries, opposed such
increased transparency, as they feared “trials by media” and undue
public pressure. Insisting on the intergovernmental nature of the WTO,
developing countries equally rejected efforts by the US and the EC to
formalize the acceptance of amicus curiae, or “friend of the court”, briefs.
Amicus curiae briefs are unsolicited reports which a private person or
entity submits to an adjudicative body in order to support (and possibly
influence) its decision-making. These briefs became an issue for the first
time in 1998 when the Appellate Body decided in US–Shrimp/Turtle7 that
the panel had the authority to accept unsolicited amicus curiae briefs.
That right was subsequently confirmed in further disputes, causing
6 United States–Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Amendments Thereto (brought by
the EC) (WT/DS200).
7 United States–Import prohibition of shrimp and Shrimp Products (brought by India,
Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand) (WT/DS58).
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outrage among many developing country Members who feared undue
interference from NGOs.8
As has been mentioned before, the DSU review negotiations should
have been concluded by 1 January 1999 and a decision on whether to
continue, modify, or terminate the DSU should have been taken at the
Seattle Ministerial Conference in late 1999. Despite fairly intense
discussions on the DSU review and a first extension of the deadline
until July 1999, no result was achieved. In further informal consultations
organized by Japan, a proposal was hammered out and later submitted
to the December 1999 Ministerial meeting in Seattle. Co-sponsored by
the EC, Canada, Korea, Switzerland and 10 other industrial and
developing countries, this so-called Suzuki text sought to clarify the
“sequencing issue” and certain other problems of the DSU. The proposal,
however, did not enjoy sufficient support among Members, and
ministers failed to take the decision which would have been required.
1.2 The “Limbo” in the DSU Review Negotiations (2000-
2001)9
After the December 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference had failed, the
DSU review essentially remained in limbo through most of 2000 and
2001. Isolated efforts of Members to change the DSU failed.
However, as DSU practice moved along, negotiating positions changed
behind the scenes. New developments in the case US–Foreign Sales
Corporations which the US had lost and where implementation measures
were now disputed, weakened in particular the US position on issues
such as carousel or sequencing. After it had become increasingly clear
that the US replacement legislation (Extraterritorial Income Exclusion
Act; ETI) would not be in compliance with the recommendations of the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the US and the EC negotiated, in
September 2000, a bilateral procedural agreement on how to proceed in
this case in order to bridge the gaps in the DSU on the sequencing issue.
According to the agreement, a sequencing approach was adopted under
8 On the amicus curiae issue, see, for instance, G. C. Umbricht (2001), “An ‘Amicus
Curiae Brief’ on Amicus Curiae Briefs at the WTO”, 4(4) Journal of International Economic
Law 773-794 (2001); P.C. Mavroidis, “Amicus Curiae Briefs Before The WTO: Much
Ado About Nothing”; Jean Monnet Working Paper 2/01 (2001); G. Marceau and M.
Stilwell, “Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating
Bodies”, 4(1) Journal of International Economic Law 155-187 (2001). For further
references, see also Th. A. Zimmermann, Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding 172-176 (London: Cameron May, 2006).
9 For a detailed discussion and further references, see Th. A. Zimmermann, Negotiating
the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 105-111 (London: Cameron
May, 2006).
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which a panel (subject to appeal) would review the WTO consistency
of the replacement legislation, and arbitration on the appropriate level
of sanctions would be conducted only if the replacement legislation
was found WTO-inconsistent. The US had now become a beneficiary of
the sequencing approach (even with the possibility of subsequent
appeal) which it had opposed before. It is believed that, in exchange for
the agreement, the US had to back down on carousel retaliation although
no such deal had been explicitly made part of the procedural agreement.
The retaliatory measures requested by the EC were several times higher
than US retaliation in EC–Bananas and EC–Hormones combined.10 The
arbitrators later confirmed that the suspension of concessions in the form
of 100 per cent ad valorem duties on imports worth 4.043 bn USD, as
requested by the EC, constituted “appropriate countermeasures”.
US–Foreign Sales Corporations was not the only case that had a weakening
impact on the negotiating stance of the US. With more and more trade
remedy cases – traditionally the Achilles heel of US trade policy – being
brought against the US and the latter losing most of these, the US stance
in WTO dispute settlement changed from offensive into highly defensive
(see Graphs 1 and 2).
Graph 1: The United States as Complainant and Defendant (1995-2004)
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10 The respective amounts are USD 191.4 mn in EC–Bananas and USD 116.8m in EC–
Hormones.
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Author’s calculations and graph; based on WTO data (WT/DS/OV/22
and on the WTO website http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_status_e.htm, downloaded on 15 January 2005)
Graph 2: The United States as Defendant: Trade Remedy and Other Cases
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Author’s calculations and graph; based on WTO data (WT/DS/OV/22
and on the WTO website http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_status_e.htm, downloaded on 15 January 2005)
As attempts to move the DSU review forward in 2000 and 2001 proved
to be unsuccessful, the DSU review only returned to the fore at the Fourth
Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001. The Doha Ministerial
Declaration committed Members to negotiate on improvements to and
clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
1.3 The Doha-Mandated DSU Review Negotiations (2002-
2004)11
According to the Doha mandate on the DSU Review, an agreement was
to be reached not later than May 2003. Formal and informal discussions
11 See also Paragraph 47 of the Ministerial Declaration, Adopted on 14 November
2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1). For a detailed discussion and further references, see Th.
A. Zimmermann, Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
111-122 (London: Cameron May, 2006).
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were held under the auspices of the Special Negotiating Session of the
Dispute Settlement Body, chaired by Péter Balás of Hungary. Work
progressed from a general exchange of views to a discussion of
conceptual proposals put forward by Members. In total, 42 specific
proposals had been submitted by the deadline of the negotiations at
the end of May 2003. The negotiations were very comprehensive. Not
only did they cover virtually all provisions of the DSU,12 but they also
included a variety of Members, including, inter alia, all the “Quad”
Members (with submissions being made by the EC, the US, Canada and
Japan) as well as developing countries of all sizes and stages of
development.
Compared with the pre-Seattle stage of the DSU review negotiations,
negotiating positions were less clear-cut now. The most remarkable
change occurred in the position of the United States, which reflected its
new defensive stance in dispute settlement practice. In December 2002
the US submitted, jointly with Chile, a proposal to strengthen flexibility
and member control in dispute settlement.13 The proposal would allow
the deletion of portions of panel or Appellate Body reports by agreement
of the parties to a dispute, and it would also provide for an only partial
adoption of such reports by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
Moreover, it calls for “some form of additional guidance” to WTO
adjudicative bodies. The gist of the submission is to transfer influence
from the adjudicative bodies to the parties to a dispute, and to Member
governments through the DSB. The proposal was greeted predominantly
with skepticism, with Members arguing that deleting parts of panel or
Appellate Body reports would weaken the WTO adjudicating bodies.
Moreover, the move was seen as a contradiction to earlier proposals on
improving transparency as parties would be able to “bury” more
controversial or groundbreaking decisions by the adjudicating bodies
before the rulings would become public. The proposal was understood
as attending to the complaints from US Congress that the WTO
adjudicating bodies were legislating and thus exceeding their authority.
A large number of other proposals, only some of which can be presented
here, were submitted. The EC reiterated calls (familiar from the pre-
12 For an overview, see Th. A. Zimmermann, Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding (London: Cameron May, 2006), at 127-165 (on stage-specific
proposals) and at 167-198 (on horizontal proposals).
13 See TN/DS/W/28 (US, Chile) for the conceptual proposal, and TN/DS/W/52 (US,
Chile) for the textual proposal. For a discussion of this proposal, see C.-D. Ehlermann,
Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO, 6(3) Journal of International Economic
Law 695-708 (2003). See also the critical remarks in Consultative Board, “The Future of
the WTO – Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium – Report by
the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi” 56 (WTO,
2004, available online at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/
future_wto_e.pdf), which presumably refers to the US-Chilean proposal.
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Seattle review) for the establishment of a permanent panel body instead
of the current system where panelists are appointed ad hoc, discharging
their tasks on a part-time basis and in addition to their ordinary duties.14
Developing countries submitted a variety of proposals with quite
different orientations. For instance, some countries sought to strengthen
enforcement by introducing collective retaliation.15 It is meant to address
the problems caused by the lack of retaliatory power of many small
developing economies, such as those experienced by Ecuador in EC–
Bananas. With collective retaliation, all WTO Members would be
authorized (or even obliged under the concept of collective
responsibility) to suspend concessions vis-à-vis a non-complying
Member. Proposals for the retroactive calculation of the level of
nullification and impairment and for making the suspension of
concessions or other obligations (SCOO) a negotiable instrument
(Mexico),16 for introducing a fast-track panel procedure (Brazil),17 and
for calculating increased levels of nullification or impairment
(Ecuador)18 have a similar thrust. At the same time, the African Group
questioned the automaticity of the current dispute settlement process
and sought the reintroduction of more political elements.19 China even
proposed the introduction of a quantitative limitation on the number
of complaints per year that countries could bring against a particular
developing country.20
By contrast to these highly controversial proposals, a large number of
less controversial submissions were integrated into a compromise text
that was elaborated by Ambassador Péter Balás of Hungary. This so-
called Balás text21 contains modifications to all stages of the process,
including, inter alia, improved notification requirements for mutually
agreed solutions, a procedure to overcome the “sequencing issue” in
Articles 21.5 and 22 DSU, the introduction of an interim review into the
appellate review stage, and a remand procedure in which an issue may
be remanded to the original panel in case the Appellate Body is not able
fully to address an issue due to a lack of factual information in the panel
report. The compromise text would also have introduced numerous
amendments in other areas, including, inter alia, housekeeping proposals,
14 See TN/DS/W/1, No I (EC), and Attachment, No 7.
15 See TN/DS/W/15, No. 6, and TN/DS/W/42, No IX (both submitted by the African
Group) as well as TN/DS/W/17 (LDC Group). For a discussion on collective retaliation,
see J. Pauwelyn, “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO – Rules are Rules –
Toward a More Collective Approach”, 94(2) American Journal of International Law
335-347 (2000).
16 See TN/DS/W/23 and TN/DS/W/40 (both submitted by Mexico).
17 See TN/DS/W/45 and TN/DS/W/45/Rev.1 (Brazil).
18 See TN/DS/W/9 and TN/DS/W/33 (both submitted by Ecuador).
19 See TN/DS/W/15 and TN/DS/W/42 (both submitted by the African Group).
20 See TN/DS/W/29, No 1, and TN/DS/W/57, No 1 (both submitted by China).
21 See TN/DS/9.
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enhanced third party rights, enhanced compensation, and several
provisions on the special and differential treatment of developing
countries.
Despite the existence of this compromise proposal, the deadline for the
completion of the talks that had been set for the end of May 2003 was
finally missed. While many smaller trading nations would have favored
coming to a conclusion on a limited package of issues such as the Balás
text, both the EC and the US preferred negotiations to continue, and to
address those (of their) concerns that had been left out in the Balás text.
Members subsequently agreed to extend the deadline for the review
until the end of May 2004. However, the review negotiations did not re-
gain their previous momentum. The failure of the Fifth Ministerial
Conference held in Cancún (Mexico) in mid-September 2003 caused a
further setback to overall negotiations under the Doha mandate which
also affected the DSU review negotiations adversely. The May 2004
deadline was missed again. The chairman then established a brief report
on his own responsibility to the Trade Negotiations Committee. He
suggested continuing the negotiations, however, without any new target
date.22 In the subsequent decision adopted by the General Council on 1
August 2004 on the Doha Work Program – the so-called “July Package”
– the General Council took note of the above-mentioned report, and the
continuation of negotiations according to the Doha Mandate along the
lines set out in the chairman’s report was decided.23
The Special Negotiating Session of the DSB met two more times in
October and November 2004, yet without achieving any significant
progress. Negotiations continued in 2005 with six dates being reserved
for further meetings before the summer break.
2. Problems in Concluding the DSU Review
The difficulties which negotiators have faced so far in their attempts to
reach a successful conclusion of the DSU review negotiations may be
explained with several reasons. Some of the major reasons shall be
discussed subsequently in more detail.
2.1 Consensus Requirement for Changes to the DSU
Traditionally, political decision-making in the consensus-oriented
GATT/WTO regime is a cumbersome process, and hurdles for
22 See TN/DS/10.
23 See WT/L/579.
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amendments to the texts are very high. The rules for such amendments
are established in Article X WTO agreement. The particular systemic
importance of the DSU in the architecture of the multilateral trading
system is reflected by a specific provision on amendments to the DSU
which is laid down in Article X.8 WTO agreement. It reads as follows:
Any Member of the WTO may initiate a proposal to amend the
provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 2
and 3 by submitting such proposal to the Ministerial Conference.
The decision to approve amendments to the Multilateral Trade
Agreement in Annex 2 [ie the DSU; note by the author] shall be
made by consensus and these amendments shall take effect for
all Members upon approval by the Ministerial Conference. ...
In other words, any amendment of the DSU requires a consensus decision
and approval by the Ministerial Conference. To understand this
provision, it is helpful to recall the meaning of the term “consensus”
and to contrast it with the concept of “unanimity” which is not meant
here. Consensus in GATT parlance means that no Member, present at
the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed
decision. Whereas the concept apparently grants veto powers, absent
parties (or those abstaining from voting) do not prevent such consensus.
Consensus thus gives Members a tool which they can use to protect
their vital interests. If they do not wish to support an amendment but
do not have “strong feelings” against it either, they may abstain from a
vote without thereby inhibiting consensus. Yet, even in such cases, the
consensus requirement gives Members some leverage for bargaining as
they could still make their agreement to a modification conditional upon
approval of their own proposals in the same or in another negotiating
area.
Such bargaining opportunities in the DSU review negotiations under
the Doha mandate are, however, very limited. According to this
mandate, Members were to come to a conclusion on the DSU review
prior to the overall deadline for the Doha Round negotiations. Whereas
this attempt of Members to reap an “early harvest”, and the resulting
partial insulation of the DSU review from other negotiating areas may
facilitate an issue-oriented discussion which is not burdened by
factually unnecessary but politically motivated linkages, the political
advantages of package deals when it comes to agreeing on the issues
discussed are being lost. Each negotiator needs to see his own position,
however controversial it may be, reflected to some extent in a potential
agreement on the DSU review because there is no scope for bargaining
across different negotiating areas. This could lead to a more polarized
discussion in which compromise and an agreement are more difficult
to achieve.
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2.2 Controversial Views on Specific Issues
As in other negotiating areas of the Doha Round, Members partially
pursue negotiating objectives in the DSU review that appear to be
diametrically opposed to each other, or otherwise irreconcilable. Major
issue-specific controversies have shaped in particular the early stages
of the DSU review (ie the 1998-1999 stage). These controversies arose
between the US and the EC, and between industrialized and developing
countries. Whereas the debate has softened in most of these areas,
diverging approaches to these issues remain.
The transatlantic divide was particularly strong in the initial stage of
the DSU review (1998-1999). The US was mainly preoccupied with
strengthening the enforcement quality of the system, as it denounced
any idea of “sequencing” between Article 21.5 and Article 22 DSU as
“delay tactics”, and as it explored the possibility of carousel retaliation
to increase the impact of the suspension of concessions and other
obligations (SCOO) on the defendant. By contrast, the EC sought to avoid
the “teeth” of the system to delay the SCOO as it was struggling with
the implementation of the rulings in Bananas and Hormones, hence its
insistence on sequencing and on a prohibition of carousel retaliation.
Both positions were so far apart and apparently essential enough for
each party that there was no scope for an agreement that would have
enjoyed consensus between both partners in the early stages of the review
exercise. The change in the US position from offensive into defensive –
in particular after the lost FSC case and after the surge of complaints
against US trade remedy measures – made this topic lose some of its
acrimony.
The North-South divide regarded initially mainly questions related to
the openness of the dispute settlement system and options for
participation from civil society. Some industrialized countries, and the
US in particular, have been strongly in favor of more transparency in
order to appease increasingly critical domestic constituents and powerful
NGOs. By contrast, major emerging and developing countries including
Mexico, Malaysia, Egypt and India sharply opposed any opening of the
dispute settlement process and thus pursued diametrically opposed
negotiating objectives.
Whereas transparency and amicus briefs were clearly the most
controversial North-South issues during the initial stage of the review
exercise, the discussion evolved over time. Concerning amicus briefs, the
Appellate Body developed its own approach that allowed it to retain a
maximum of flexibility. It thus created accomplished facts despite harsh
criticism from developing countries. Northern countries now began to
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signal that they could live with the practice developed by the Appellate
Body. Developing countries, on the other hand, will have realized that
amicus briefs have so far not had a decisive role in the adjudicative
decision-making. In this light, demands for action on the amicus issue
increasingly resemble bargaining chips that may, at a later stage, be
traded against concessions in more important areas.
With regard to external transparency and openness of the system,
however, the divisive approach seems to remain – at least prima facie.
Nevertheless, one is tempted to question the US insistence on increasing
external transparency in the light of more recent US calls for increased
Member control and flexibility of dispute settlement. Such negotiating
flexibility is at odds with transparency and public scrutiny. Moreover, a
very recent development could show the way forward. In September
2005, panel proceedings were opened for the first time to the public,
following a joint request by the parties to the respective disputes (see
below).
The two major lines of controversy (US-EC, North-South) as outlined
above can explain to some extent why no consensus on the outcome of
the DSU review has been achieved in the past. In this light, attempts of
many small and medium-sized traders to move the review and to settle
at least on a mini-package of less controversial improvements in the
interest of the system, had no chance of realization.
2.3 The Fundamental Controversy: Power Orientation versus
Rule Orientation
In addition to issue-specific divergences, there is also a more profound
controversy regarding the overall direction the DSU should pursue.
Should the dispute settlement system continue its route towards more
rule-orientation and adjudication (as it did in the past 30 years), or
should it rather return to a more diplomatic – ie power-oriented –
approach?24 For the purpose of this contribution, rule-orientation is
24 Rule-orientation and power-orientation as basic concepts for the settlement of
international trade disputes were initially introduced into the literature by J. H. Jackson,
“The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System”, 12(2) Journal of World Trade
93-106 (1978). He described power oriented techniques as suggesting “a diplomat
asserting, subtly or otherwise, the power of the nation he represents. In general, such
a diplomat prefers negotiation as a method of settling matters, because he can bring to
bear the power of his nation to win advantage in particular negotiations … Needless
to say, often large countries tend to favor this technique more than do small countries;
the latter being more inclined to institutionalized or ‘rule oriented’ structures of
international activity. A rule oriented approach, by way of contrast, would suggest
that a rule be formulated which makes broad policy sense for the benefit of the world
and the parties concerned, and then there should be an attempt to develop institutions
to insure the highest possible degree of adherence to that rule. In the case of disputes
between countries, a power oriented approach is often utilized in the negotiation, so
Continued
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understood as the heavy reliance on procedural and material rules for
the settlement of trade disputes, ideally involving independent third
party adjudication. By contrast, a power-oriented or diplomacy-
oriented dispute settlement procedure relies strongly on political
negotiations and therefore on the political power of the parties
concerned. In such a setting, the role of procedural and material rules
for the settlement of disputes is limited. The role and independence of
third party adjudication is also subject to narrow limits in a power-
oriented setting.
Each of these two generic orientations is reflected in a substantial part
of the proposals.
Among others, the following proposals could be regarded as contributing
directly or indirectly to more rule-orientation:
• Strengthened notification requirements for mutually acceptable
solutions (MASs) and the requirement to submit written reports on
the outcome of consultations. In the past, the sort of many
consultation requests has remained in the dark. In some
instances, it has not become known whether and how a
dispute has been resolved, despite the existence of a general
obligation to notify such MASs. Absent correct
notifications, however, it cannot be excluded that MASs
are not in full conformity with WTO disciplines.
Specifically, it is thinkable that a MAS comes at the expense
of a third party. In order to strengthen the notification of
MASs, Japan25 and some developing countries26 called for a
more precise wording of the notification requirement in
Article 3.6 DSU that would explicitly oblige disputing
parties to notify such solutions to the DSB. Jamaica
...that the dispute, even if it involves a breach of a rule, may be settled more from the
point of view of who has the effective power, economic or otherwise, than from the
point of view of determining whether a rule has been breached. A rule oriented
approach, on the other hand, would also involve negotiation for a settlement, but in
such a negotiation the negotiators would be more inclined to resolve the dispute by
reference to what they would expect an international body would conclude about the
action of the transgressor in relation to its international obligations.” (p 98 et seq.). For
a short overview, see J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System – Law and Policy of
International Economic Relations 109 ff (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997, 2nd
ed). For a critical comment, see M. S. Dunne III, “Redefining Power Orientation: A
Reassessment of Jackson’s Paradigm in light of Asymmetries of Power, Negotiation,
and Compliance in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System”, 34 Law and Policy in
International Business 277-342 (2002).
25 See TN/DS/W/22, Attachment, No 15 (Japan), and TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, No
16 (Japan).
26 See TN/DS/W/18 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania Zimbabwe) and TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
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suggested that the party requesting consultations should
submit a factual and concise written report from the
consultations to the DSB that would indicate whether a
mutually agreed solution had been found.27 In other terms,
not only mutually agreed solutions (as under the proposals
by Japan and some developing countries) would have to
be notified but all matters subject to consultations under
the DSU would, sooner or later, be concluded with a report.
These proposals could thus make early settlements more
transparent. Such transparency, in turn, could create both
normative and political pressure for solutions that are not
too far apart from WTO rules and from the outcome of
potential litigation. They could therefore strengthen the
rule-oriented element in dispute settlement.
• Compliance Reviews of MASs: The EC proposed the creation
of a new Article 22bis on the examination of mutually
agreed solutions (MASs) which would make a notified
MAS subject to a compliance review. If it were found that
the defendant did not comply with the mutually agreed
solution as notified, the complainant would be entitled to
request an authorization from the DSB to suspend
concessions or other obligations.28 Compliance reviews of
mutually agreed solutions would make the latter better
enforceable. That could increase their attractiveness for
complainants and strengthen the security and
predictability of trading conditions under such solutions.
• Reduced timeframes: Several proposals have been submitted
that aim at the explicit or implicit reduction of timeframes
in the DSU. The “explicit” category includes reduced
timeframes for consultations and for the determination of
the RPT. The “implicit” category includes the removal of
the requirement that panels are established only at the
second meeting after the request has appeared on the DSB
agenda, or the introduction of a provision that would
mandate Members to submit their first written submission
along with the panel request. The establishment of a fast-
track panel procedure follows similar intentions. Such
proposals would generally deprive Members of time and
options that are available for diplomatic tactics,
“controlled escalation”, and the search for political
27 See, for instance, TN/DS/W/21 (Jamaica).
28 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, No 29 (EC).
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compromise. In doing so, these proposals could speed up
the way to a legal settlement. However, the actual impact
of such changes should not be overrated. Time frames in
the DSU are already relatively short. Delays occur more
often because already-existing time frames are not being
respected. Such delays cannot be eliminated by simply
reducing time frames on paper.
• The creation of a professional permanent panel body (PPB): One
far-reaching proposal is the EC call for a permanent panel
body (PPB).29 It is aimed at assuring the supply of qualified
panelists and at overcoming the mounting problems in
the selection of panelists for individual cases, as parties
find it increasingly difficult to agree on the composition of
a panel in the current ad hoc appointment system. The EC
also hopes that a system of permanent panelists would
result in a professionalization of the panel process with
fewer reversals of cases and altogether shorter timeframes
for the procedure. The establishment of a PPB could also
further contribute to the evolution of a consistent body of
precedent law. Opponents of the idea of a permanent panel
body fear that a PPB could be more “ideological” than ad-
hoc panels and engage in judicial activism or law making.
The current system of appointing panel members by
agreement or with the help of the Director General has also
been seen as giving Members certain flexibility and to be
therefore in line with the “Member-driven” approach of
the WTO. It has also been argued that permanent panelists
could pursue a more legalistic approach to dispute
settlement than government officials on whom the current
system strongly relies, since the latter are expected to be
more familiar with the constraints faced by governments.
In a similar sense, opponents of the proposal argue that a
permanent panel body could be more “ideological” and
might engage in law-making. There are also constitutional
implications, as the move towards a permanent panel body
would delink law-making and adjudication and further
alienate trade diplomacy, giving rise to complaints about
an extensive judicialization of trade policy and
governments’ increased loss of control. Moreover, with
Members losing their control of the composition of panels,
potential considerations related to reappointment as a
panelist could have less weight in a PPB, thereby increasing
29 See TN/DS/W/1, No I and Attachment, No 7 (EC).
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the independence of panelists. Of course, its actual impact
would depend largely on the composition of the PPB, eg on
whether it would mainly be composed of litigation-
oriented lawyers or of government officials. All in all,
shifting from ad hoc panels to a PPB has the potential of
significantly increasing the rule-orientation of the system.30
• Terms of appointment of the Appellate Body: The EC proposed
converting the Appellate Body mandate into full-time
appointment.31 Regarding the terms of appointment, a
group of developing countries suggested changing the
terms of appointment for Appellate Body members into
non-renewable six-year terms,32 a proposal also brought by
the EC.33 By thus removing any potential considerations
related to reappointment, the proposal could further
strengthen the independence of Appellate Body members
and their ability to focus solely on legal considerations in
their decision-making.
• Sequencing and implementation: A major portion of the
proposals on the implementation stage are dedicated to the
elaboration of a solution to sequencing and other open
issues (such as the lifting of retaliatory measures) in this
30 The proposal has been discussed intensely in scholarly literature. Support for the
idea is expressed, to varying degrees, by J. H. J. Bourgeois, “Comment on a WTO
Permanent Panel Body”, 6(1) Journal of International Economic Law 211-214 (2003);
Th. Cottier, “The WTO Permanent Panel Body – A Bridge Too Far?”, 6(1) Journal of
International Economic Law 187-202 (2003); Th. Cottier, “Proposals for Moving from
Ad Hoc Panels to Permanent WTO Panelists, in E.-U. Petersmann (ed), Preparing the
Doha Development Round: Improvements and Clarifications of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding 40-52 (2002); W. J. Davey, “The Case for a WTO Permanent Panel
Body”, 6(1) Journal of International Economic Law 177-186 (2003); and W. J. Davey, “A
Permanent Panel Body for WTO Dispute Settlement – Desirable or Practical”, in D. L.
M. Kennedy and J. D. Southwick (eds), The Political Economy of International Trade
Law – Essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec 496-527 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000). A more cautious approach is contained in M. Cartland, “Comment on a
WTO Permanent Panel Body”, 6(1) Journal of International Economic Law 214-218
(2003); J. C. Hecht, “Operation of WTO Dispute Settlement Panels – Assessing
Proposals for Reform”, 31(3) Law and Policy in International Business 657-664 (2000);
and in A. W. Shoyer, “Panel Selection in WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures”, 6(1)
Journal of International Economic Law 203-209 (2003).
31 See TN/DS/W/1, No V (EC). See also C.-D. Ehlermann, “Six Years on the Bench of
the “World Trade Court” – Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate
Body of the World Trade Organization”, 36(4) Journal of World Trade 605-639 (2002),
who views such a shift as unavoidable.
32 See TN/DS/W/18 and TN/DS/W/18/Add.1, No IV (Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and  Zimbabwe), as well as TN/DS/W/47
(India, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
33 See TN/DS/W/3 (Thailand, Philippines); TN/DS/W/38, No V (EC); TN/DS/W/8,
lit. c (Australia), TN/DS/W/34, lit. c (Australia) and the proposed change to Art 22.7
DSU as contained in TN/DS/W/49 (Australia).
460
Reform and Development of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
ultimate stage of WTO dispute settlement. By clarifying
the DSU and suggesting one-fits-all solutions, the need for
bilateral negotiations on procedural aspects would be
substantially reduced. This could move this final stage of
dispute settlement towards more rule-orientation. The same
holds for other proposals such as the strengthening of the
defendant’s reporting requirements in the implementation
stage, the obligation of the complainant to submit the list
of concessions it wishes to withdraw along with its request
for an authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations, notification requirements of retaliatory
measures taken, and the extension of the scope of
compliance review procedures to arbitration awards.
• Prohibition of carousel retaliation: The proposals for a discipline
prohibiting the use of carousel retaliation34 would have a
somewhat ambiguous effect. On the one hand, prohibiting
carousel retaliation would eliminate legal uncertainty
with regard to the application of retaliatory measures.
Market conditions for the defendant’s exporters would,
despite being restricted through retaliatory measures,
remain predictable and agreed-on trade rules would
continue to apply to non-affected exports. A prohibition of
carousel retaliation would also be in line with the
requirement that retaliation shall be equivalent to the level
of nullification or impairment. By thus reducing the
potential cost of the suspension of concessions or other
obligations for the defendant, however, there would
presumably be less pressure towards compliance.
• Strengthened enforcement: Several proposals to strengthen
compliance and the enforcement of material WTO law have
been submitted, mostly by emerging or developing
economies. Their basic rationale is to increase the cost of a
violation for defendants and thus the incentives for prompt
compliance. At the same time, they seek to ensure that
reciprocity is maintained and that the negotiated balance
of rights and obligations is protected. These submissions
include proposals on collective retaliation;35 freedom of
cross-retaliation;36 retroactive determination and
34 See TN/DS/W/1, No II.D and subsequent legal text (EC).
35 See TN/DS/W/15, No 6 (African Group), and see TN/DS/W/42, No. IX (African
Group); TN/DS/W/17, No. 15 (LDC Group).
36 See the proposal for a new Art. 22.3bis in TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia).
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application of nullification and impairment, including the
allocation of litigation expenses;37 mandatory (monetary)
compensation,38 including for measures withdrawn during
proceedings; and the negotiability of the right to suspend
concessions or other obligations.39 Other measures such as
preventive measures,40 the suspension of a defendant’s right
to use the dispute settlement mechanism as a complainant
if it does not comply with adverse rulings,41 the fast-track
panel procedure,42 the method of calculating increased
amounts of nullification or impairment in the case of
“mandatory laws”,43 and the proposed change to the
doctrine of “discretionary laws”44 also follow a similar
thrust. However, these proposals may be more difficult to
implement and may unfold some adverse effects as well.
All these proposals have in common that they would restrict
the ability of Members to reach policy goals by means of
trade policy interventions in contravention of WTO
disciplines.
• Strengthened third party rights: A variety of proposals has been
brought with a view of improving third party
participation in DSU procedures.45 Strengthened third party
rights increase internal transparency and may raise the
costs of negotiated settlements. Potentially affected third
parties will have better opportunities to oppose bilateral
deals between the main parties to a dispute if such deals
are at their expense, or if they include any other violation
of the most-favored nation clause. In general, improved
third party rights impose limitations on the negotiating
37 See TN/DS/W/23, No II(b) (Mexico). For the textual proposal, see the modified Art
22.7 as included in TN/DS/W/40 (Mexico), where the inclusion of litigation costs has
been dropped.
38 See TN/DS/W/15, No 5 (African Group) and also TN/DS/W/42, No VIII (African
Group). On (monetary) compensation, see also TN/DS/W/17, No 13 (LDC Group);
TN/DS/W/33 (Ecuador); and TN/DS/W/29, No 2 (China).
39 See TN/DS/W/23, No II(d) (Mexico) and, for a textual proposal, Art 22.7bis in TN/
DS/W/40 (Mexico).
40 See TN/DS/W/23, No II(c) (Mexico) and, for a textual proposal, Art 12.6bis and
12.6ter in TN/DS/W/40 (Mexico).
41 See TN/DS/W/9 (Ecuador).
42 See TN/DS/W/45 (Brazil) and TN/DS/W/45/Rev.1 (Brazil).
43 See TN/DS/W/22, No 2(a) (Japan) and TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, No 21 (Japan).
44 See TN/DS/W/22, No 2(b) (Japan) and TN/DS/W/32, Attachment, No 22 (Japan).
45 See in particular, TN/DS/W/12 and TN/DS/W/12/Rev.1 (Costa Rica); see also TN/
DS/W/38, No III (EC), TN/DS/W/25, No. II and TN/DS/W/36 (Taiwan); TN/DS/W/
44 (Jamaica), TN/DS/W/18 and TN/DS/W/18/Rev.1 (Cuba, Honduras, India, Jamaica,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe), TN/DS/W/47 (India, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia), TN/DS/W/15 and TN/
DS/W/42, No IV (African Group); TN/DS/W/8, lit. b and TN/DS/W/34, lit. b (Australia).
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flexibility of the main parties to a dispute by reducing
opportunities for settlements that are too far away from
WTO principles.
• Increased external transparency: Some industrialised countries
have called for increased transparency in dispute
settlement.46 Similar to strengthened third party rights and
strengthened notification requirements, external
transparency sheds light on negotiations and therefore
tends to “disinfect” bilateral deals from negotiated elements
that are not necessarily in line with WTO provisions. The
logic is that concessions within gentlemen’s agreements
and package deals would become more difficult to maintain
as adversely affected interest groups would pressure their
governments to take a “hard stance” and bring issues to
adjudication instead of settling on compromises with
“unnecessary concessions”. Not surprisingly, empirical
studies have found that democracies find it particularly
hard to settle if the process is public. Some observers
therefore warn against the increase of transparency as it
could preclude early settlements. Transparency can thus
be associated with the move towards a more accountable,
rules-based system, whereas the current confidentiality
requirements and lack of public transparency rather belong
to the domain of diplomatic negotiations.47
Although there is no agreement in the DSU review negotiations on the
issue of external transparency, the recent decision of two panels to open
their proceedings to the public may be considered an interesting
precedent (see also Section 2.2. above): In the complaint of the EU against
the continued application of retaliatory measures by the United States
and Canada against the EU in the Hormones case,48 the parties to the
dispute had requested jointly that the proceedings be opened to the
public. The panels subsequently followed this request and the panel
hearings of 12 – 13 September 2005 were broadcast by closed-circuit
46 See TN/DS/W/13 (United States) and TN/DS/W/46 (United States); TN/DS/W/41,
No 3 (Canada); TN/DS/W/1, Attachment (EC); TN/DS/W/22 (Japan).
47 For a detailed discussion of the various facets of transparency, see J. Waincymer,
“Transparency of Dispute Settlement Within the World Trade Organization”, 24(3)
Melbourne University Law Review, 797-838 (2000). See also Th. A. Zimmermann,
Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 167 et seq. (London:
Cameron May, 2006) for an introductory discussion and further references.
48 United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute (WT/
DS320) and Canada–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute
(WT/DS321).
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television to an audience of trade negotiators, NGO representatives,
media and academics that had gathered at the WTO in Geneva. By
contrast, the panels’ meetings with third parties remained closed to the
public since not all of the third parties had agreed to open the
proceedings.49
As opposed to a substantial number of proposals submitted in favour
of increasing the rules-based elements of dispute settlement, some of
the proposals show a tendency towards power-orientation and a more
negotiations-based approach to dispute settlement. These include the
following:
• Automatic lapse or withdrawal of consultations/panel requests:
Proposals brought by the European Union and Jordan
provide for the automatic lapse of consultations/panel
requests and for an easier withdrawal of such requests.50
Both submissions could facilitate the use of consultation
and panel requests as tactical, negotiatory instruments.
Notification requirements for mutually agreed solutions
could be spurned even more easily than today if
consultation or panel requests were to dissipate
automatically. This could enhance the flexibility of
disputing parties to come to whatever agreement they
prefer in a given dispute, thus diminishing the impact of
material WTO rules on early settlements and the role of
adjudicating bodies.
• Calls for separate opinions by individual panellists/Appelate Body
members: Calls for panel or Appellate Body members51 to
hand down their opinions separately could expose
individual members of the adjudicating bodies to undue
pressure from governments or other interests and reduce
their independence. This holds in particular as long as
panelists continue to be appointed ad hoc, and as long as
Appellate Body members are subject to re-election in case
they wish to serve a second term, which is possible under
current rules. Therefore, requiring panelists or Appellate
Body members to hand down separate opinions might lead
to more “political” decisions.
49 See “Beef Hormones Dispute Hearings to Be Opened to Public”, in Bridges Weekly
Trade News Digest, Vol 9, No 29, 7 September 2005; “First Public WTO Dispute
Settlement Hearing Under Way”, in Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol 9, No 30, 15
September 2005.
50 See TN/DS/W/1 (EC), Attachment No 4; TN/DS/W/43, No III (Jordan); and TN/
DS/W/53 (Jordan).
51 See TN/DS/W/17 (LDC Group) and TN/DS/W/42, No VI (African Group).
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• Flexibility during appellate review: Several proposals seek to
introduce more flexibility and Member control at the
appellate stage by introducing an interim review52 and by
allowing the suspension of the appellate procedures.53 The
appellate stage is currently the most rule-oriented stage of
the process, with cases undergoing review by law experts
without much Member control over the procedure. This
stage is therefore targeted by those Members who would
prefer a less rigid approach to dispute settlement. The
interim review and the suspension of procedures would
provide Members with a new political instrument and with
increased possibilities for bilateral negotiations at a stage
which has so far remained largely outside their control.
• Deletion of findings from reports: A US-Chilean proposal to
allow parties to delete findings from panel and Appellate
Body reports by mutual agreement54 could fundamentally
alter the nature of the DSU. Its implementation could lead
to situations where a weaker party in a bilateral setting
could come under considerable pressure from a more
powerful counterpart to consent to such deletion.
Moreover, the proposal might harm third parties, as their
interest in a ruling on a specific issue would be disregarded.
The proposal is also at odds with calls for more
transparency. The role of adjudicating bodies would
diminish as they could be prevented from making findings
which could contribute to the further evolution of the
multilateral trading system.
• Partial adoption procedures: Another proposal in the afore-
mentioned US-Chilean submission is to allow the DSB to
decide by consensus not to adopt specific findings or the
basic rationale behind a finding in a report.55 This proposal
would thus give the DSB a means to correct the
jurisprudence of adjudicating bodies. By contrast to the
deletion of findings from reports by the parties to the
dispute, this modification appears to be less problematic.
52 See TN/DS/W/28, No 6(a) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit. a (US, Chile).
53 See TN/DS/W/28, No 6(d) (US, Chile), and TN/DS/W/52, lit. d, proposed amendment
to Art. 17.5 DSU (US, Chile).
54 See TN/DS/W/28, No 6(b) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit. b, proposing changes
to Art 12.7 and Art 17.13 DSU (US, Chile).
55 See TN/DS/W/28, No 6(c) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit. c, proposing changes
to Art. 16.4 and Art 17.14 DSU (US, Chile); see also Parts 6.2.5 and 6.3.6.
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It would not take place in a bilateral setting, but in the
multilateral setting of the DSB, and it would require
consensus. The proposal is therefore basically in line with
the Member-driven character of the organisation, and it
could remedy to some extent the existing imbalance
between the (strong) legal and the (weak) political decision-
making mechanisms in the WTO system (see below in Part
5).
• Special and differential treatment for developing countries: Several
proposals have been made that would increase flexibility
for developing countries in the DSU and ease the “burden”
of rule-orientation upon them. For instance, proposals for
the implementation stage such as the extension of the RPT
to two to three years in cases with developing country
defendants56 could reduce the pressure to comply with
WTO rules for these countries. Moreover, the proposition
of a limit on the number of cases per calendar year that
could be brought against a particular developing country57
might provide an effective means for developing countries
to shield themselves against challenges to their trade policy
measures and against the enforcement of WTO disciplines.
This would, in turn, undermine the credibility of their trade
policy commitments both internally (eg vis-à-vis domestic
interests seeking protection) and externally (vis-à-vis their
trade partners).
• Various other proposals: Several other proposals would
increase the negotiating flexibility of Members during the
procedure and help them gain more political control over
the mechanism. These include the EC proposal to give
parties to a dispute the possibility of extending any
timeframe in the DSU by mutual agreement,58 proposals
to oblige adjudicating bodies to submit certain issues to
the General Council for interpretation,59 and the calls by
the US and Chile to provide “additional guidance” to WTO
adjudicative bodies.60
Table 1 contains a non-exhaustive summary of DSU reform proposals
according to their orientation.
56 See TN/DS/W/19, proposal on Art 21.2, lit. b(i) (Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe).
57 See TN/DS/W/29, No 1 and TN/DS/W/57, No 1 (China).
58 See TN/DS/W/1, Attachment, No 1.
59 See TN/DS/W/42, No I (African Group).
60 See TN/DS/W28, No 6(f) (US, Chile) and TN/DS/W/52, lit. f (US, Chile).
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Table 1: “Power-Orientation” versus “Rule-Orientation” in the Doha Round DSU
Negotiations61
61 For more details, see Th. A. Zimmermann, Negotiating the review of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding 204-214 (London: Cameron May, 2006).
Proposals strengthening 
“rule orientation”  
Proposals strengthening “power 
orientation” 
• Strengthened notification 
requirements for 
mutually acceptable 
solutions and written 
reports on the outcome 
of consultations; 
• Compliance reviews of 
mutually agreed 
solutions; 
• Reduced time frames; 
• Creation of a 
professional permanent 
panel body (PPB); 
• Terms of appointment of 
the Appellate Body; 
• Regulating sequencing 
and implementation; 
• Prohibition of carousel 
retaliation; 
• Strengthening 
enforcement and 
increasing the cost of 
non-compliance; 
• Strengthening third 
party rights;  
• Increasing external 
transparency. 
 
• Automatic lapse or 
withdrawal of 
consultations/panel requests; 
• Calls for separate opinions 
by individual 
panelists/Appellate Body 
members; 
• Flexibility during appellate 
review: interim review and 
the suspension of the 
appellate procedures;  
• Deletion of findings from 
reports;  
• Partial adoption procedures; 
• Additional measures of 
special and differential 
treatment of developing 
countries; 
• Extension of timeframes by 
agreement of the parties; 
• Obliging adjudicating bodies 
to submit certain issues to 
the General Council for 
interpretation;  
•      Providing “additional   
guidance” to    adjudicating 
bodies. 
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With regard to this dichotomy of rule-oriented versus power-oriented
proposals, a word of caution needs, however, to be said. Whereas the
immediate contribution of certain reform proposals towards either more
rule-orientation or more power-orientation in the system may be quite
straightforward, the overall effect may be less clear. It cannot be excluded
that increased rule-orientation in the dispute settlement system might
drive more powerful Members out of the WTO system and induce them
to solve their trade disputes outside the multilateral arena where their
power has greater leverage. In such a scenario, the overall role of
multilateral disciplines for the resolution of international trade disputes
could factually diminish. Such concerns are not just theoretic
considerations, as history shows: In the 1960s, GATT dispute settlement
became virtually inactive as a spirit of “anti-legalism” prevailed and
complaints were regarded as unfriendly confrontations poisoning the
atmosphere.62
The basic controversy between rule-oriented and power-oriented
proposals in the DSU review therefore also reflects a broader discussion
on what some commentators recently perceive to be a general imbalance
between the relatively effective legal decision-making process (as
incorporated in the DSU) and the relatively ineffective political decision-
making process in the WTO.63 Unlike the lengthy search for compromise
at the negotiating table, the quasi-automatic architecture of the DSU
allows complainants to exact decisions on politically highly sensitive
issues from the dispute settlement system. It is therefore hardly
surprising that the DSU is the forum of choice for governments that
perceive their position to be in accordance with WTO rules. Again, the
danger associated is that Member governments that see their interests
insufficiently safeguarded in such a setting might be driven out of the
system.
There are currently two strands in the WTO literature that seek to
strike a balance between the strong dispute settlement system and the
weak, consensus-based political decision-making process at the WTO.
One school of thought – probably the minority point of view – seeks to
re-strengthen Members’ political control of WTO dispute settlement
and to weaken its adjudication character.64 Other authors, however,
Butterworth, 1990).
63 See for instance, C.-D. Ehlermann, “Tensions Between the Dispute Settlement Process
and the Diplomatic and Treaty-Making Activities of the WTO” 1(3) World Trade Review
301-308 (2002).
64 See C. E. Barfield, “WTO Dispute Settlement System in Need of Change”, 37(3)
Intereconomics – Review of European Economic Policy 131-134 (2002); and C. E. Barfield,
Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization
(Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 2001). An earlier contribution to the discussion
from a critical perspective is J. Hippler Bello, “The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding – Less Is More”, 90(3) The American Journal of International Law 416-
418 (1996).
62 See R.E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy 235-250 (Salem:
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vehemently oppose any effort to weaken the adjudication system and
argue in favor of focusing reform efforts on improved political decision-
making.65 Both avenues have their pitfalls as the brief discussion in the
conclusions will show.
2.4 The Difficulty of Negotiating a System in Use
Some problems of the DSU review may be explained with the difficulties
of negotiating reforms to a system that is constantly in use. Negotiating
positions are subject to permanent change as Members continuously
gather new experience due to new cases and new reports. Moreover,
on-going negotiations on material WTO rules (eg the negotiations on
“Rules”, including on anti-dumping) may also have a bearing on the
stance of Members towards the dispute settlement system. Such
problems could be partly remedied by including generous transition
periods for any change to the DSU.
2.5 General Sense of Satisfaction and the “Do No Harm”
Imperative
Finally, despite the criticism that is occasionally voiced,66 there seems
to be a general sense of satisfaction with the system. As the Consultative
Board (2004, p 56) holds with regard to the lack of success of the DSU
review to date: “… an important underlying concern is, or should be, to
not ‘do any harm’ to the existing system since it has so many valuable
attributes.”
65 See C.-D. Ehlermann, “Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO”, 6(3) Journal
of International Economic Law 695-708 (2003); C.-D. Ehlermann, “Six Years on the
Bench of the “World Trade Court” – Some Personal Experiences as Member of the
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization”, 36(4) Journal of World Trade 605-
639 (2002); C.-D. Ehlermann, “Tensions Between the Dispute Settlement Process and
the Diplomatic and Treaty-Making Activities of the WTO”; 1(3) World Trade Review
301-308 (2002); J. H. Jackson, “Perceptions about the WTO trade institutions”, 1(1)
World Trade Review 101-114 (2002); D. P. Steger, “Review of: Claude E. Barfield, Free
Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy – The Future of the World Trade Organization”, 5(2)
Journal of International Economic Law 565-570 (2002). Proposals for new reforms to
political decision-making are included, for instance, in J. J. Schott and J. Watal,
“Decision-Making in the WTO”, Policy Brief 00-2 (Washington: Institute for
International Economics: 2000); and in Th. Cottier and S. Takenoshita, “The Balance of
Power in WTO Decision-Making – Towards Weighted Voting in Legislative
Response”, 59(2) Aussenwirtschaft 171-214 (2003).
66 See for instance the criticism in D. Wilson and L. Starchuk, “Judicial Activism in the WTO
– Implications for the Doha Negotiations”; Manuscript, 13 September 2003; http://
www.johnstonbuchan.com/pubs/trade/judicial%20Activism%20in%20the%20WTO.pdf
(downloaded on 16 September 2003), and the particularly strong criticism contained
in J. Ragosta, N. Joneja and M. Zeldovich, “WTO Dispute Settlement – The System Is
Flawed and Must Be Fixed”; http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/
wto_dispute_settlement_is_flawed.pdf (visited on 10 September 2003).
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Although there is clear scope for improvements, there appears to be a
well-founded fear that the required, mostly technical modifications
should not come at the expense of fundamental alterations of the system
that are being asked for by some Members. This holds in particular for
those changes to the DSU, which would mostly be motivated by
“adverse” experiences and by particular interests of single countries,
and which would not necessarily be in the overall interest of the system.
In this context, it is understandable that Members prefer to ignore
political negotiating mandates and let the DSU review negotiations drag
on, regardless of previously fixed deadlines.
3. Elements of a “DSU Review in Practice”
Whereas the political negotiations on the reform of the DSU have stalled,
practical solutions have been found to some of the problems in the
application of the mechanism. Indeed, there has been some kind of a
“DSU review in practice”. It includes practical actions both by Members
and by the adjudicating bodies further to develop the system and to
come to terms with the problems in its application. The following
examples may serve as illustrations.
First, the sequencing problem has been overcome by the conclusion of
bilateral agreements between the parties to a dispute during the
implementation stage. These agreements allow Members to overcome
the gaps and contradictions in the DSU text in a practical way. Whereas
there has not yet been a consensus to adapt the DSU text to this evolving
practice, Members no longer appear to consider the sequencing issue as
a pressing concern.
Secondly, with regard to amicus curiae briefs, the Appellate Body has de
facto developed a very pragmatic approach, despite initially strong
opposition from mostly developing countries. On the one hand, the
Appellate Body displays a general openness towards the acceptance of
amicus curiae briefs. On the other hand, it does not appear to accord
decisive weight to these submissions in its decisions – at least not
explicitly. This approach gives adjudicating bodies a maximum of
flexibility while it respects the concerns of Members who are against
such briefs.
Thirdly, on a related matter, the Appellate Body has found a response
to the concerns of many Members who held that the acceptance of amicus
curiae briefs gave NGOs an edge over Members, as the latter had to cope
with restrictive requirements on third country participation. It relaxed
these requirements by adopting new working procedures in late 2002
which give third parties the possibility of attending oral hearings even
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if they had not made a written submission prior to the hearing, as the
old rule had required.67
Fourthly, the Appellate Body adopted new working procedures
requiring more precision in notices of appeal. It thus catered for a long
standing concern of some Members who had called for increased
precision of notices of appeal but have been unable to reach such a
modification through the DSU review negotiations.68
Fifthly, regarding external transparency, recent developments
(September 2005) have shown that the current system allows some
flexibility. The panels in the respective cases69 opened to the public their
proceedings with the main parties to the dispute, as the latter had jointly
requested. At the same time, the proceedings with third parties remained
closed, as not all third parties had agreed to such an opening of the
process.
As a final example, the establishment of an Advisory Centre on World
Trade Law (ACWL) has remedied some of the resource constraints that
developing countries face in the more sophisticated legal settings of the
new dispute settlement system. This international organisation, which
is independent from the WTO, provides legal training, support and
advice on WTO Law and on dispute settlement procedures to developing
countries, in particular to least-developed countries. ACWL services
are available against the payment of modest fees for legal services
varying with the share of world trade and GNP per capita of user
governments.70 The Center thus serves to a certain degree as a substitute
for other institutions such as, for instance, a special fund for developing
countries. Developing countries had proposed the establishment of such
a fund during the DSU review negotiations.
Conclusions
At the time of writing, the DSU review negotiations have been going on
for roughly seven years. Despite the submission of many interesting
67 These modifications were introduced into document WT/AB/WP/7 (meanwhile
replaced by WT/AB/WP/8). See also “WTO Appellate Body Braces for Criticism For
Easing Rules on Third Party Participation”, in WTO Reporter, 10 October 2002; “WTO
Appellate Body Chair Offers To Discuss Appellate Review Rules”, in WTO Reporter,
23 October 2002; and “Appellate Body to Clarify Working Procedures on Role of
Third Parties”, in Inside US Trade, 15 November 2002.
68 WT/AB/WP/8. The new procedures entered into force on 1 January 2005.
69 United States–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute (WT/
DS320) and Canada–Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones Dispute
(WT/DS321).
70 For more information on the ACWL, see http://www.acwl.ch – in particular http://
www.acwl.ch/e/quickguide_e.aspx.
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proposals and partly intense negotiating activity, no agreement on DSU
reforms has so far emerged at the negotiating table.
Nevertheless, as the afore-mentioned examples of the “DSU Review in
practice” show, Members and adjudicating bodies manage to adapt the
dispute settlement system continuously to changing circumstances
without changing one single provision of the DSU. Dispute settlement
practice has thus brought some amount of DSU reform, without facing
the problems of political renegotiations of the DSU text. In other terms,
the system seems to build once more on its historic strength, which is
to evolve with a certain degree of flexibility and in a pragmatic spirit.
This makes a timely completion of the DSU clearly less urgent. We should
not be surprised if, as in the past, these elements of evolving practice
(see Section 4) were to be codified into a new or modified text at a later
date.
Today, the major challenge for the DSU is not so much whether the
multitude of mainly technical questions in the DSU review negotiations
can be built into an agreement but, rather, how well suited the DSU is to
overcome the more fundamental concern – notably that there is an
unsustainable imbalance between political and judicial decision-making
in the WTO.
None of the two generic options that are being discussed to remedy the
situation – weakening adjudication or strengthening political decision-
making – holds great promise, if considered in isolation. Weakening
adjudication is not an attractive option as Members would have to forego
the achievements which the new DSU has brought for a rules-based
international trading system. It would also be at odds with
globalization and its increasing reliance on international transactions
in economic life, which require a predictable and stable regulatory
framework for international trade. Alternatively, improving political
decision-making is an extremely difficult task and could result in
important Members being driven out of the system, if the sacred
consensus principle were to be replaced by some form of majority voting.
Sovereignty concerns similar to those that are currently voiced against
allegedly overreaching dispute settlement would ultimately be raised
against majority voting procedures as they would eventually force
results upon countries which the latter cannot or do not want to accept.
For the time being, only incremental steps by a variety of actors
therefore seem to be feasible and desirable to remedy the imbalance:
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• Members could assume their systemic responsibility by
exercising restraint in bringing politically sensitive cases
to adjudication.
• Adjudicating bodies could continue their current approach
to dispute settlement, based on judicial restraint and on
the avoidance of “sweeping statements”.
• Selective multilateral political elements could be built into
the dispute settlement procedure without altering the basic
architecture of the DSU (eg by allowing the DSB to decide
by consensus not to adopt specific findings or the basic
rationale behind a finding in a report.)
• Members may want to explore improvements to the WTO’s
political decision-making mechanisms more actively.
Indeed, the WTO community has become aware of the
problems as the recent report by a “Consultative Group”
to the Director General shows. This report has a clear focus
on institutional issues, including on decision-making.71
Whereas such a gradual and eclectic approach may not satisfy the more
ambitious observers who might favor clear reforms in either direction
– ie towards more adjudication and rule-orientation or back to power-
orientation and diplomacy – this eclecticism appears at least as a feasible,
pragmatic option. And, if judged in the light of past experience with the
gradual and rather pragmatic evolution of the system, it also appears
to be the most promising approach. The current DSU is the fruit of five
decades of gradual development, which was not even free of setbacks.
There is no reason to assume why such gradualism should not be
adequate for the future as well. If Members and adjudicating bodies
continue to assume their responsibility for the system, the DSU has
good chances to remain an attractive forum for dispute settlement.
71 See Consultative Board, “The Future of the WTO – Addressing institutional challenges
in the new millennium – Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General
Supachai Panitchpakdi” 56 (WTO, 2004, available online at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf)
